

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

„Aristotle on Nature”



JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY
IN KRAKÓW

17th April – 18th April 2026



Program of the seminar “Aristotle on Nature”
Kraków, representative halls, Bracka 12
17th April 2026

9:30 – 10:00 coffee time

10:00 – 10:15 – Welcoming and introduction, Prof. Marta Soniewicka, Vice-Dean for Research at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the Jagiellonian University

Panel I: 10:15-11:45

Chair: Prof. Liesbeth Huppés-Cluysenaer

10:15 – 10:35 – Prof. Sule Sahin Ceylan (Marmara University), *Aristotle and T.H. Green on Human Sociability*

10:35 – 10:55 – Prof. Richard J. Dougherty (University of Dallas), *Aristotle on the Naturalness of the City, and the Citizen*

10:55 – 11:15 – Dr. Martin Koloušek (Charles University), *Aristotle and Hobbes on the State*

11:15 – 11:45 – Discussion

11:45 – 12:15 coffee break

Panel II: 12:15-13:15

Chair: Prof. Giovanni Bombelli (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan)

12:15 – 12:35 – Prof. Liesbeth Huppés-Cluysenaer, *From Techne to Ethos: Aristotle on Practice, Nature, and the Limits of Cognition*

12:35 – 12:55 – Prof. Diego Poole (Rey Juan Carlos University), *The Relationship Between Moral Virtue and the Communitarian Ethos According to Aristotle*

12:55 – 13:15 – Discussion

13:15-14:30 lunch

Panel III 14:30-16:00

Chair: Prof. Marta Soniewicka (Jagiellonian University)

14:30 – 14:50 – Prof. Stefano Fuselli (University of Padova), *On the Relationship Between Nature and Human Activities in Aristotle*

14:50 – 15:10 – Dr. Tommi Ralli (University of Bremen), *Nature, Craft, and Imitation: Disanalogies to Virtue*

15:10 – 15:30 – Discussion

19:00 – dinner at the restaurant Klimaty Południa, 5 Gertrudy St.

18th April 2026

10:00 – 10:30 coffee time

Panel I 10:30 – 12:00

Chair: Prof. Stefano Fuselli (University of Padova)

10:30 – 10:50 – Prof. Iwona Barwicka-Tylek (Jagiellonian University), *Aristotle on Human Nature: Why Becoming a God Is Easier than Becoming Human (and Why It Matters)*

10:50 – 11:10 – Prof. Giovanni Bombelli (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart), *On the complexity of Aristotle's Model of "Nature" and Some Contemporary Projections*

11:10 – 11:30 – Prof. Fabio Macioce (LUMSA University), *The Need for Beauty: Human Nature, Desire, and Political Community in Aristotle*

11:30 – 12:00 – discussion

12:00 – 12:30 coffee break

Panel II 12:30-14:15

Chair: Diego Poole (Rey Juan Carlos University)

12:30 – 12:50 – Dr. Gerard Drosterij (Fontys University of Applied Sciences), *Aristoteles' Conception of Akrasia and Augustine's conception of original sin as models for understanding human nature and action*

12:50 – 13:10 – Dr. Tomi P. Hämäläinen (University of Eastern Finland), *Aristotle's Dialectics and Moral Refutation in the New Testament*

13:10 – 13:40 – discussion

13:40 – 14:00 – closing remarks, Prof. Diego Poole (Rey Juan Carlos University) & Prof. Marta Soniewicka (Jagiellonian University)

14:00- 15:30 lunch

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

17th April – 18th April 2026

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

This conference aims to bring together scholars from philosophy, classics, law, theology, and the natural sciences to explore Aristotle's concept of nature in its multiple dimensions.

Around the 5th century BC, in the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus, Heraclitus is said to have deposited a book that summarized his entire body of knowledge.¹ In that book appeared the enigmatic maxim: *Φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ* (“Nature loves to hide”? “That which brings forth is inclined to conceal itself, to perish”? “Form tends toward dissolution”?)². Successive generations, which we may consider the first glimpses of reflection on the mystery of reality, sought to interpret these three words³. However, that may forever preserve its obscurity. Perhaps, like Nature itself, Heraclitus' words love to hide⁴.

So too with Aristotle's words⁵. Mindful of centuries of reconstructing the *corpus aristotelicum* and of the fact that “the history of thought is often the history of misunderstandings”⁶, we seek once more to engage with Aristotle's philosophy of nature.

Aristotle understood nature as the principle of motion and rest, an internal cause of being that develops itself⁷. His conception integrates biological, metaphysical, and ethical- political perspectives: from studies of organisms and the cosmos, through reflections on causality and purpose, to considerations of communal life and the role of man as a naturally political being⁸. We therefore wish to approach nature interdisciplinarily, through both the scientific (“Promethean”) and the metaphysical (“Orphic”) methods⁹.

¹ Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁵ Justin Winzenrieth, *The Textual Transmission of the Aristotelian Corpus*, in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2025 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-text/>.

⁶ Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 17.

⁷ Aristotle, *Physics*, ed. and trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 2.1, 192b20–23.

The conference builds upon this Aristotelian legacy while also confronting it with modern science and philosophy. It is of no minor philosophical significance that pioneers of molecular biology and Nobel laureates in medicine, such as François Jacob and Max Delbrück, recognized in Aristotle's concept of *εἶδος* features that we now attribute to the genetic program¹⁰. Similarly, in ethics, philosophy of law, and politics, contemporary authors explicitly drawing inspiration from the thought of the Stagirite constitute central - albeit often opposed - voices in the debate. To mention only a few: Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, Leo Strauss, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Martha C. Nussbaum, William Galston, and Tibor Macha¹¹.

The organizers also do not wish to remain indifferent to questions concerning the relation between Aristotle's philosophy of nature and religion. "The Bible does not know the concept of nature"¹², wrote Leo Strauss, who emphasized that Mediterranean civilization was shaped by the continuous conflict of its two pillars: Athens and Jerusalem¹³. We wish to inquire into this conflict also under contemporary conditions through the prism of Aristotle's thought. At the same time, we intend to consider the philosophical reception of the Stagirite not only by Christian thinkers (e.g., Boethius, Isidore of Seville, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant), but also by Jewish thinkers (e.g., Saadia Gaon, Maimonides) and finally by the Islamic tradition (e.g., Al-Kindī, Al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Averroes).

⁸ See: Antonis Ragkousis, *Aristotelian Themes in Critical Ethical Naturalism*, "Cambridge Journal of Economics" 47, no. 4 (July 2023): 853–880., Emanuela C. Fiecconi, *Elements of Biology in Aristotle's Political Science*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Biology*, ed. Sarah M. Connell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 211–227.

⁹ Terms coined by P. Hadot. See: *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 155.

¹⁰ François Jacob, *La Logique du Vivant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 9., Max Delbrück, *Aristotle-totle-totle*, in "Of Microbes and Life", ed. Jacques Monod and Ernest Borek (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 50–55. Ernst Mayr, *The Idea of Teleology*, "Journal of the History of Ideas" 53, no. 1 (January– March 1992), p. 117–135.

¹¹ Fred D. Miller Jr., "Aristotle's Political Theory," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/#ArisModePoli>

¹² Leo Strauss, *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity: Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 381.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 139.

Finally, we wish to explore the context of another pillar — Roman law — which Strauss appears to have overlooked. We remain open to attempts at comparing and identifying correlations between Aristotle's concept of nature, his philosophy of natural law and Roman law, as well as its later reception in European and global legal systems. It will be particularly useful to analyze the role that nature played in the thinking of jurists and in relation to law dependent on convention, as well as to analyze the extent to which nature was a point of reference in the formulation of rules.

The **deadline for full paper submission is March 31, 2026**. Please send them to the email address given below. We also consider publishing a volume on Aristotle and nature based on the best papers presented at the conference and other invited contributions. More details will be provided after the conference.

Conference Organising Committee:

Prof. Marta Soniewicka (Jagiellonian University, marta.soniewicka@uj.edu.pl)

Prof. Diego Poole (Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, diego.poole@gmail.com)

Research ass. Szymon Gawor (Jagiellonian University, szymon.gawor@student.uj.edu.pl) – secretary

ABSTRACTS

Sule Sahin Ceylan

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Aristotle and T.H. Green on Human Sociability

This paper examines the accounts of human sociability developed by Aristotle and T. H. Green, highlighting both their continuities and significant differences. For Aristotle, the human being is by nature a politikon zōon whose rational capacities can be fully realized only within the polis; political community is therefore not a conventional arrangement but the natural context for the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue. Green, writing within the tradition of British Idealism and drawing on Aristotle as well as Kant, reformulates this insight in modern terms. He argues that the social nature of the individual reflects participation in an eternal self-consciousness that unites rational actors in a shared moral order. On this view, freedom and self-realization are achieved through contribution to this shared moral consciousness which is expressed in the pursuit of the common good. Whereas Aristotle grounds sociability in the teleological structure of human nature, Green locates it in an ethical idealism that transforms the classical idea of the polis into a modern conception of community based on moral interdependence. I will compare their perspectives on the social nature of human beings and discuss the crucial role of common good as a unifying concept between community and individuals in both theories.

Richard J. Dougherty

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Aristotle on the Naturalness of the City, and the Citizen

In Aristotle's *Politics* we encounter arguably the classical presentation of the nature and naturalness of the city. The polis, for Aristotle, is the authoritative human association, a natural result of the organization of households into villages and villages into the polis. The polis exists by nature, and it follows from this that man, the inhabitant of the polis, is "by nature a political animal." Indeed, to be by nature without a polis is to be either worse or better than man. The polis arises out of a type of necessity, for none of its constituent entities (the single man, the household, and the village) can achieve self-sufficiency. Yet, there are multiple passages even in the opening chapters of the *Politics* that compel one to further reflection on the claim of the naturalness of the city, including the role of women and slaves within the city and the household. The enduring character of the household, and its relationship to the city, is also, we discover, more complicated than we might have thought at first glance. This paper aims at arriving at a fuller understanding of Aristotle's view of the naturalness of the city, in part by comparing and contrasting it with that found in other seminal thinkers, such as Plato, Cicero, and Aquinas. The question of nature in Aristotle's account seems inherently tied to a particular understanding of justice, an understanding that can be found in different forms in each of these thinkers.

Martin Koloušek

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Aristotle and Hobbes on the State

What is the nature of political bodies? For Aristotle, *polis* exists by nature. For Thomas Hobbes, the commonwealth is artificial. These two views are at the core of two traditions and are traditionally understood as opposite ones. Both have rather significant consequences too. What is the legitimacy of a state? What is the relationship between the state and the individual? Is the human being a political animal, or a wolf? The answer to these and other related questions is determined by the answer to the question whether we choose Aristotle or Hobbes. Yet some argue that these two positions are not

mutually exclusive and that there are some common features of both theories. In my paper, I intend to take this approach even further. My main argument is that while using different language and coming from different perspectives, Aristotle and Hobbes are essentially climbing the same mountain. Both philosophers claim that for a human being, it is necessary to be in a state. They both agree that a human being living outside of a state is either God or a beast. Yet it seems that they disagree on basic principles of their political philosophy. Is it so? I do not think so. For Aristotle, even though *polis* is an association by nature, it still needs to be created. For Hobbes, even though commonwealth is an artificial entity, it is still created due to the natural conditions of humans. Therefore, I believe a unified account of both theories can be presented.

Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer

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From Techne to Ethos: Aristotle on Practice, Nature, and the Limits of Cognition

Kant introduced the distinction between is and ought at the expense of the tripartite distinction of Aristotle: ethical practice, technical practice and theory. To understand the meaning of the ethical concepts “custom”, “law” and “provision” in Aristotle’s view, one should investigate the concepts of technical practice “routine”, “productive theory”, and “comparative theory”. The ethical concepts are conscious imitations of these technical concepts. To understand Aristotle’s view on the meaning of the good at which pure explanatory theory is aimed, it should be taken into account that it refers to nature and not to culture. Aristotle rejects the possibility of ethical theory: ethics is about virtue not about cognition.

Diego Poole

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The Relationship Between Moral Virtue and the Communitarian Ethos According to Aristotle

In this paper, we analyze the relationship that Aristotle establishes between moral virtues and the specific community toward which they correctly dispose us. According to him, it is not virtue itself that we seek first and foremost: rather, we should first aspire to achieve a common good together with others, and only then can we regard as virtues those personal qualities that enable us to attain that common good. Virtues are always correct dispositions toward the common good of a particular community. To understand the nature of a virtue, it is necessary first to define or establish the common activity to be carried out. As Aristotle illustrates, to be a virtuous zither player, one must first have created the zither. Different communities require different virtues. MacIntyre points out, following Aristotle, moral norms consist of the constitutive rules of the community in which we learn and follow them. Their fulfillment constitutes our training to collaborate in the proper function of that community — that is, our improvement as its members.

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On the Relationship Between Nature and Human Activities in Aristotle

Aristotle's works indicate at least three types of relationships between human activities and nature (*physis*). These three types can be traced back to three different areas. The first is that of science (*episteme*), in which the first principles of *physis* are investigated (*Phys.* I, 1.). The second is that of art and technique (*techne*), in which human activity uses *physis* as a tool or end of its work, according to the modes of imitating (*mimēsthai*) and completing (*epitelein* – *Phys.* II, 8). The third area is that of action (*praxis*) – as an activity distinct from production (*poiesis* – *NE*, VI, 1140 a 5-6). Through *praxis*, human beings are united with a range of entities ranging from the stars to plants, including animals (*De Coel.*, II, 12). At the same time, however, human beings are distinct from them in that human *praxis* is not aimed at mere living, but

at the *eudaimonia* provided by good life (*Pol*, I, 2;VII, 3). The purpose of this presentation is to explore the differences that characterize these three different modes of human relationship to *physis*. In the theoretical attitude proper to science, human beings place themselves outside *physis* in order to grasp and circumscribe it in the completeness of its principles. In the technical attitude, human beings immerse themselves in *physis*, making use of the potentialities it makes available to them. In the third case, human beings are neither external to *physis*, in that they share the *praxis* proper to every entity that has within itself the principle of its own movement, nor internal to *physis*, because human *praxis* is aimed at the realization of the good life. The analysis takes as its guiding thread the idea of limit (*peras* - *Met.* V, 17). In the first case, human beings set out to grasp the constitutive limit of *physis*, going beyond it. In the second case, by seeking to replicate natural processes in the means-end relationship, they remain on this side of that limit. In the third case, human beings, in realizing themselves, place themselves on the constitutive limit of *physis*.

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Nature, Craft, and Imitation: Disanalogies to Virtue

The purpose of this article is to compare the emergence and increase of craft, on one side, and those of the virtues and wisdom, on the other. The aim is to think, in the first place, about the time-consuming acquisition of craft and then, comparatively, contrasts with ethical virtue and *phronēsis*. We begin with the leading part that teaching and the teacher of a craft have in *NE* 2.1. This text contains no reference to any individual differences in natural abilities underlying virtue acquisition. We understand, though, that our early work and practice create styles natural to us, and emulation improves our craft. So, I next examine what clues to imitation, if any, there are in the *Nicomachean* sections concerning virtue acquisition, as has been suggested recently (e.g., “Imitating Virtue”, Hampson 2019). In principle, copying the right actions of another can be conceived as one means of learning conventional morality, as opposed to the development of the individual’s virtues (Murdoch 1964). In special cases (Fallon 2013), mimicry may also aid social functioning. Traditional wisdom literature has often warned against imitating the master (e.g., Suzuki 1949). Against that, Aristotle’s use of Theognis’ view of learning good things in the company of the good seems to take us in another direction. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish next that Aristotle’s use of Theognis in *NE* 9.12 concerns friendship of good persons, beyond utility friendship, and the friends correct each other, which is to say they both learn from the other. Finally, there remain the reference to “natural dispositions” in a very different context (the book on the intellectual virtues, 1144a23–b17) and Aristotle’s remarks on imitation and on the poet as “εὐφρηγής” in the *Poetics*. The first reference leads us to examine its context, Aristotle’s loose analogy in response to Plato’s claims.

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Analogy As It Emerges From Nature and Its Projection in Legal History

Legal scholars, when contemplating analogy, are usually led to the schemes of *analogia legis* and *analogia iuris*. However, the modern-illuminist duality fails to offer a useful concept of analogy for legal history analysis, surely because the two types of analogy only receive a systematization in the work of Wächter in 1825, but also because *analogia legis* and *analogia iuris* are not logical schemes independent from deduction and induction. A more productive endeavor can be found in the reconstruction of the Aristotelian concept of analogy, where the first step consists of the search for a singular concept that overshadows the distinction between argument from example (*paradeigma*) and argument from likeness (*homoiototes*). Without ignoring the legacy of the Aristotelian tradition on analogy, such unison concept must only be found in the *corpus aristotelicum* itself, although in an unexpected place. According to Schumacher’s proposal, it is in the *Physics*—more precisely, in the methodology used in the *Physics*—that Aristotle develops the capacity of analogy to

speak of what is not directly spoken of through *logos*. Therefore, analogy can potentially bring to speakability hidden components of *logos* such as the privation (*steresis*) and the underlying matter (*hypokeimenon*), as well as underline the central role of *nous* in this process. The remaining question is whether this Aristotelian concept of analogy can offer legal history new grounds for the comprehension of Laws historical development.

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Aristotle on Human Nature: Why Becoming a God Is Easier than Becoming Human (and Why It Matters)

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (I.5), Aristotle distinguishes three ways of life: the life of pleasure, the political life, and the contemplative (philosophical) life. The last, he claims, is the most divine: “As far as we can, we should make ourselves immortal and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us” (*NE* X.7, 1177b31-34) – our intellect. The contemplative life is stable and self-sufficient, relatively independent of external conditions. The political life – aimed at a “common work” (*History of Animals* 1.1.488a8) – appears far more fragile, contingent, and hard to define or achieve.

This creates a paradox: within Aristotle’s framework, it can seem easier to become “godlike” than fully human. Contemplation requires only intellect, while human life demands the difficult integration of reason, desire, and action within a political community. Hence, the common view that Aristotle’s ideal of *human* development moves toward the perfection of divine quality is questionable – it would, in fact, entail losing key features of being human. Aristotle himself rejects such a scheme (at least with respect to social development) in *Politics* II.2 (1261a19-22).

Also contemporary Aristotelians emphasize that humans are not gods and that they flourish best in practical, civic life, when mutual cooperation of free individuals is possible. Yet in this “practical turn,” I argue, the paradox remains embedded, which is especially evident in educational proposals. Precisely because becoming godlike is easier than becoming human, even strictly practically oriented education – such as legal education – is to a large extent reluctant to cultivate human competences in students. As I will try to show, Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis*, much more than the concept of virtue, could help make education more practical in the philosopher’s sense.

Giovanni Bombelli

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On the complexity of Aristotle’s model of “nature” and some contemporary projections

This proposal is structured on the following steps. A methodological premise. The Aristotelian (Greek) notion of “nature” (*phusis*) elicits a radically different approach from the modern-Western experimental methodology. The concept of *phusis* (etimologically derived from the verb *phuo*) reveals an internal complexity that allows it to be compared (maybe overlapped) to the category of being (as some historical re-readings of the Aristotelian thought attest). First point: the relevance of the nexus ‘nature-metaphysics’. Aristotle’s outlook involves a structural *continuum* between “nature” and “metaphysics”. It can be described as a “biological metaphysics” or as a “metaphysical biology”: Aristotle’s biology looks “ontologically vitalistic” and in turn his ontology seems not to renounce to the biological basis (Prigogine-Stengers 1979). Second point: the relation *Physics-Metaphysics*. The cross-examination of some relevant points articulated within *Physics* (i.e. *Physics II*) and *Metaphysics* (especially *Metaphysics IV*: particularly “movement”, “telos”, “sinol”) emphasizes the difference among the Aristotelian approach, the “physiologists’s setting” and the platonic perspective. Third point: some reflexes on the contemporary debate. Aristotle’s framework can be a theoretically fruitful tool for understanding some aspects of the current debate: two levels closely related can be remarked. The first one concerns the anthropological dimension (Lennox 2021). The combination between the analysis developed within *Historia animalium* and *De partibus animalium* and the circular relation biology-ontology-metaphysics allows Aristotle to draw a *continuum* among the different levels of the life world (including the mankind: see *On the soul* and the “biological” works). The second level entails the implementation of policies. The holistic nature of Aristotle’s approach makes it a framework suitable to contemporary issues: see, for instance, the issue of climate change, which could be rethought through the Aristotelian pair ‘human intervention-nature’ discussed in some works (i.e. *Meteorology* and so on).

Gerard Drosterij

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Aristoteles' conception of akrasia and Augustine's conception of original sin as models for understanding human nature and action

In this paper a comparison is made between Aristotle's concept of akrasia in relation to his conception of human nature and Augustine's concept of original sin in relation to his conception of human nature. How do humans act against their own better judgment? This article examines two foundational and seemingly incompatible answers: Aristotle's akrasia (weakness of will) and Augustine's doctrine of the divided will. For Aristotle (EN, Book VII), weakness of the will (*akrasia*) relates to the situation where 'lower' appetites or passions temporarily overwhelm deliberation. The akratic person fails to put into action his deliberations due to passion's interference. Augustine radically reimagines this phenomenon, or so it seems. What Aristotle treats as exceptional becomes universal with Augustine. The problem isn't passion overwhelming reason but the will itself being fundamentally divided: "The mind commands itself to will, yet it does not do what it orders." (Confessions, Book VII) Augustine describes two wills in conflict. However, both Aristotle and Augustine emphasise that deliberation of knowledge of the good action proves insufficient because the will itself is corrupted. In this article I will closely compare their conception of nature and human nature specifically and look for both similarities and differences. I especially will critically examine the prejudice that both authors fundamentally differ in understanding weakness of will (optimistic/pessimistic, deterministic/voluntarist, cognitive/theological) since Plato was for both Aristotle and Augustine their greatest influence in developing their own theories.

Tomi P. Hämäläinen

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Aristotle's Dialectics and Moral Refutation in the New Testament

Aristotle's ethical theory is grounded in the view that human nature is rational, and that we actualize this rationality by living virtuously. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle employs dialectic as a method of moral refutation (*elenchus*), aiming to correct unethical behavior by revealing its irrational and morally unacceptable consequences. This paper argues that a comparable dialectical practice of moral refutation can be identified in several textual passages of the New Testament. Thayer's Greek - English Lexicon of the New Testament renders the Greek term *elenchus* with the following nuances: (1) to convict, refute, or confute; (2) to find fault with or correct. This study of the concept of moral refutation (*elenchus*) facilitates the construction of a hermeneutical bridge between Aristotelian philosophy and the texts of early Christianity. Interpreting selected New Testament passages through the lens of Aristotelian philosophy, I demonstrate how the method of *elenchus* is employed to correct moral failings. A particularly illustrative instance of moral instruction appears in the Gospel of Matthew, where Jesus advises: "If your brother sins, go, show him his fault (*elenchon*) between thee and him alone" (Matt. 18:15, ASV). A similar motif is found in the Gospel of John: "For everyone that doeth evil hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, lest his worked should be reprov'd (*mē elenchthē*)" (John 3:20). This theme is echoed in the epistolary tradition as well: "Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching, for reproof (*elenchus*), for correction, and for instruction which is in righteousness (*dikaiosynē*)" (2 Tim. 3:16). These passages exemplify a dialectical approach for moral education and correction, wherein critique, and transformation are central to ethical development. I propose that the authors of the New Testament were familiar with the practice of dialectical refutation, a technique rooted in ancient legal proceedings and employed to cross-examine and correct unethical behavior. In conclusion, I suggest that the legal origins of dialectic help explain its dual function as both a philosophical and moral instrument. This study deepens our understanding of how ethical correction and dialectics evolved across philosophical, legal and theological traditions. This intersection of classical philosophy, legal and theological tradition may explain why dialectics later became central theme to the tradition of Scholastic philosophy.

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The Need for Beauty: Human Natura, Desire, and Political Community in Aristotle.

This paper explores the need for beauty and its ethical and political significance in Aristotle's thought. While contemporary scholarship (notably Nussbaum) has extensively examined the role of needs in Aristotle – emphasizing their political importance for social bonds, human flourishing, and the establishment of conditions enabling *eudaimonia* – the need for beauty has received less systematic attention. Building on this established framework, I argue that the desire for beauty (*to kalòn*) represents a fundamental human need in Aristotle's anthropology, and carries profound ethical and political implications. The paper proceeds in three stages. First, I synthesize existing scholarship on needs in Aristotle, highlighting how basic necessities create familial, social, and political bonds, and how their proper distribution enables individuals to flourish and live with dignity and freedom. Second, I examine the relationship between individual needs and the political circumstances required for their fulfilment, raising questions about the *polis'* responsibility in creating conditions for human thriving. In the third section, I argue that the human desire for *to kalòn* is not a contingent preference but responds to a deep-seated need rooted in human nature. Drawing on the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, I explore how this need for beauty functions both as a characteristic feature of what it means to be human and as a force with significant ethical and political dimensions. By examining beauty's role in motivating virtuous action – actions chosen *tou kalou heneka* – and shaping communal life, I argue that Aristotle's political philosophy takes the relevance of this fundamental human aspiration into account, and offers a powerful corrective to contemporary political thought, framing access to beauty not as a private preference, but as a fundamental public good essential for a flourishing community.